Many studies on decision-making in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 claim that a Groupthink syndrome led to the faulty assessment and processing of information prior to the Yom Kippur War.
Introduction
Shortly before 4am on October 6, 1973, Brigadier General Israel Lior, the
Military Secretary to the Prime Minister of Israel called then-Prime Minister
Golda Meir and reported that a message he received from the Mossad said, "Today a war will break out." Prime Minister Golda replied, "I knew it would happen. What do we do?" (Haber, 1987, p 13) . Following a "solid intelligence" from Mossad agent Ashraf Marwan, who was a senior Egyptian official and a close associate of then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, war would begin later that day.
In light of this information, five alternatives were examined (IDF Archives, 1973, p 3; Archive state, 1973, p 5) . (1) A preemptive strike against Egypt and Syria; (2) a preemptive strike only against the Syrian air force and missiles; (3) mobilization of reserves for the purposes of both defense and attack; (4) mobilization of reserves for defense only; and (5 ) finding a diplomatic solution along with the mobilization of reserves.
In this paper, we examine the views of members of the above mentioned decision-making group and the intra-group dynamic regarding:
(1) a preemptive strike (2) the mobilization of reserves, and (3) the likelihood of the outbreak of war on that day
We shall first briefly discuss the polythink syndrome along with the groupthink concept.
Groupthink and Polythink
Groupthink, as introduced by Irving Janis (1982) , is a well-known concept recognized by scholars of group decision-making and behavioral decision making. At the core of Groupthink is the claim that members of a decisionmaking group often make homogenized, uniform decisions due to social pressure, a leader's influential position, self-censorship, etc. The Polythink model, or polarized and decentralized group thinking presented by Mintz and his colleagues (Mintz and de Rouen, 2010 , Mintz and Wayne, 2016a , 2016b argues however, that on the homogeneousfragmented decision-making axis affiliated on one extreme with groupthink, the polar opposite also exists. It is a decentralized, fragmented pattern of group decision-making called "polythink". The phenomenon is characterized by divided opinions, disagreements, intra-group conflict, and confusion, even dissent, leading to decision paralysis or sub-optimal decisions.
In this paper we show that decision-making on the morning of October 6, 1973 was consistent with symptoms of the Polythink syndrome.
Furthermore, we show the transition from a groupthink syndrome to polythink on that morning.
We begin by examining the positions of the various decision-makers regarding the possibility of launching a preemptive strike on the morning of Already during the first meeting held that morning at 05:45 in the Defense Ministry, Elazar raised the issue of a preemptive strike and offered two alternatives. First, to launch preventive strikes on airports in Egypt and Syria, and second, to launch a preemptive strike against Syria's air force and missile system only (IDF Archives, 1973, p 3) . At a meeting held later that morning in Prime Minister Golda Meir's office, Elazar raised the second option only, to destroy the Syrian air force in its entirety and then Syria's missiles. Elazar explained that "a preventive strike is, of course a huge advantage. It will save many lives" (State Archives, 1973, p 5) .
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan: the defense minister met with his advisers for a preliminary discussion to discuss the issue only two hours after receiving the news (Bar-Joseph, 2001 ). Dayan vehemently opposed a preemptive strike that had been part of the discussions held at the first general staff meeting in his office at 5:45 that morning when he said, "A preventive strike is out of the question" (IDF Archives, p 3). The main reason for his objection, which he repeated several times that morning, was that Israel could not attack first, not a minute before, as long as the Americans believed that Egypt and Syria did not intend to start a war (IDF Archives, 1973, p 3; State Archives, 1973, p 3) . According to Dayan at the meeting in his office, "Even if the Americans were 100% sure [that there would be war] they will not allow us to attack first. If there is terrible news, we will go to Golda and she'll say yes. I will not recommend it"(IDF Archives, p 3).
In his autobiography, Dayan later explained that he rejected preemptive action by the Israel Air Force out of concern that it would hurt the chances of getting the full support of the United States during a war, should it break out (Dayan, 1976, p 576) .
Chief of Military Intelligence, Major General Eli Zeira: during the meeting in the defense minister's office, Zeira reassuring those present by saying that according to the Americans, "All is quiet. There will be no war" (IDF Archives, 1973, page 5) . At a later meeting in the Prime Minister's office, Zeira again minimized the severity of the threat by raising the possibility that President Sadat would change his mind and not attack. Zeira indicated there were signs from the Syrian front indicating the possibility of an attack (though built according to the Soviet military doctrine of simultaneous readiness to defend and attack), but reiterated that this did not necessarily mean that Sadat would start a war and that he would probably change his mind. "Despite the fact that they are ready, in my opinion, they [the Egyptians] know they will lose. This time it will be different. He [Sadat] has not yet given the command to start. He will probably back off at the last minute… and even if he gives it [the command for war] he could cancel it" (State Archives, p 7). While Zeira did not speak directly against a preemptive strike, it can be clearly concluded from his words that he did not support this alternative and tried to calm the meeting's participants.
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir: on October 6 at 08:05 am, members of the decision-making group gathered at Meir's office because Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Chief of Staff Elazar had failed to reach an agreement. This disagreement was a clear expression of polythink within the group. When the possibility of a preemptive strike against Syria was discussed, Meir expressed that despite being "at heart drawn to it", and although it was "very attractive", Israel could not be the one to start the war out of fear of hostile international public opinion against Israel (State Archives, pp 8-9). Thus, at the beginning of the meeting the option of preemptive strike was rejected out of hand and was not discussed again. At the end of the meeting, Golda again explained, "As to a preemptive strikewe won't be able to explain it [to the Americans and the world]" (State Archives, p 12).
Another reason for the refusal of Prime Minister Golda Meir to authorize a preemptive strike was linked to Israeli-US relations. In May, 1973, Henry Kissinger presented the President of Egypt with a timetable for negotiations according to which, by 1974 an interim agreement would be reached with Israel, and a permanent agreement a year later, when Israel would withdraw from the Sinai (Kipnis, 2012) . Prime Minister Golda Meir apparently believed that if Israel were to launch a war, the United States would not be able take Israel's side in the fighting, which Israel would probably need. Two years after the war, in her memoirs, Meir wrote that a preemptive strike might have reduced casualties at the outset, but afterwards, Israel would not have received broad US air support which, according to her, saved many lives (Medzini, 2008) .
2) Positions of members of the decision unit regarding mobilization of reserves
Another issue raised on the morning of October 6, 1973 was mobilization of the reserves. Here, too, the polythink syndrome was at play, as there were serious disagreements among members of the decision unit. The reason for Dayan's position was the fear "that everyone in the media will say that we [Israel] are going to attack"…Full mobilization before a single shot has been fired. We will immediately be called the aggressors...it is important that they don't say we started ( Force and the matter of recruiting the reservists required in the plan to transition to an offensive attack" (Dayan, 1976, p 576) .
Unlike Dayan, in the meeting in the Prime Minister's office, Elazar explained the urgency of recruiting all the reserves, saying, "If they attack in 10 hours,
we are prepared maximally with the regular army. But we haven't mobilized any reservists at all. The power of the IDF is 25% regular army and 75% reserves. To mobilize the reserves, we will need at least around 24
hours. The reservists we don't mobilize today will not be able to participate in the war tomorrow. This is a loss of one day. So I propose a large 3) Disagreements about the likelihood of war breaking out on the same day The head of military intelligence stuck to his estimation that the likelihood of war was low. Even when he was in the minority he continued to go along with the military intelligence explanation that the evacuation of Soviet advisors was out of fear and aggression demonstrated by the IDF in the weeks before the war. In addition, after receiving Ashraf Marwan's message, Zeira cast doubt on his credibility. In his book (Zeira 1993) presented the theory that Marwan was a double agent. 
The Polythink syndrome on the morning of October 6, 1973
Polythink Symptoms Mintz and Wayne (2016) , list a number of symptoms for analysts and scholars to ascertain whether a group dynamic fits the polythink syndrome, the groupthink syndrome or the Con-Div dynamic. The Polythink symptoms include disagreement among members of the decision unit, confusion and lack of communication, internal conflict, different framing by members of the decision group, leaks and more. We will now examine whether these symptoms characterized the decisions made on the morning of October 6,
1973.

1) Internal conflict among the decision-makers
Disputes and internal conflict among members of the group were expressed explicitly on the issue of mobilizing the reserves. Another miscommunication--around the use of "special measures" that could have alerted Israel in real time about Egypt's intention to go to war, was also evident. As described by Bar-Joseph (2013), the key decisionmakers, Dayan and Elazar, relied on Zeira-the head of military intelligence, to activate these measures. This did not actually happen. It occurred only in a short "dry run". However, Dayan and Elazar were unaware that the measures were not applied. Zeira implied that special measures were implemented and the understanding was that they did not yield new or relevant information. This misled the decision-makers who depended on these resources.
There was also confusion around the issue of Ashraf Marwan's warning about the time of the outbreak of war. While Zamir testified that he warned the war would break out in the evening, before sunset (Zamir and Maas, 2011) , in discussions that took place in real time, it was apparent that references were made to "the S hour" -after six o'clock in the evening (Golan, 2013) . According to Bergman and Meltzer (2003) , it is unclear where the interpretation of Zamir's message came from.
3) Different framing of information by members of the decision-making group
In the meeting in Prime Minister Golda Meir's office, the discussion about a quite. There will be no war" (IDF Archives, p 5; State Archives, p 3).
The bias in framing was also evident in the discussion around the impact of the size and scope of the mobilization of reserves. In the discussion in the Prime Minister's office, Elazar said, "In terms of international-political impact, it does not matter if we call up 70,000 or 200,000 people." Later in the discussion, former Chief of Staff Zvi Tzur concurred, saying that "…In terms of impact, nobody will know if it's 70,000 or 100,000." Finally, the Prime Minister was convinced, agreeing that "No one can measure exactly how many we mobilize" (State Archives, pp 5, 10, 12).
4) Deadlock and decision paralysis
Disagreements between Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Chief of Staff
Elazar led to a deadlock indecision-making. The stalemate delayed mobilization for reservists for several hours because of the need to contact the Prime Minister on this issue and on the preemptive strike. Eventually, partial mobilization of the reserves decided upon at the meeting with the Prime Minister began just seven hours before the expected start of the war (e.g., toward evening, around 18:00, based on Marwan's early warning) and only three hours before the actual outbreak of war (Golan, 2013) . Dayan and Elazar were unable to reach a compromise, causing a delay in the decision.
The Agranat Commission pointed out that despite the meeting in the defense minister's office, when the chief of staff and defense minister decided to mobilize the reserves for defense purposes only, the order to begin mobilization on this scale was not issued at the end of the meeting (Agranat Commission, 1975, p 34) . The Committee determined that "the mobilization order was delayed by two hours as the Chief of Staff waited for the Prime Minister's decision on the question of the scale of mobilization" (Agranat Commission, p 35).
The chief of staff explained that this was because the debate in the ministry office "ended quite tense and angrily" (Agranat Commission, 1975, p 37) .
Moreover, the chief of staff testified that he did not come out of the meeting with the understanding that an agreement had been reached between him and the defense minister (Agranat Commission, 1975 This above exchange reveals two symptoms of polythink: disagreement and confusion among the decision-makers. These two symptoms caused, as indicated in the Agranat Commission report, a delay of several hours in mobilizing the forces agreed upon and hence, decision paralysis.
5) A lowest common denominator decision
The decision adopted by Prime Minister Golda Meir on the morning of October 6, 1973 was not to launch a preemptive strike and to approve the recruitment of only about 100,000 to 120,000 reservists, the minimum number required by her chief of staff, and no more than the number agreed upon by the Defense Minister. In other words, the reservists needed for defensive purpose. The decision reached was a compromise by Golda and also the lowest common denominator acceptable to the group members.
As noted, Elazar initially insisted on the recruitment of 200,000 reservists as opposed to Dayan, who agreed to recruit between 20,000 and 50,000.
Towards the end of the discussion in the Prime Minister's Office, Elazar began to show signs of compromise. "…I am ready for a partial mobilization. But I want the four armored divisions ... all of the Air Force and four armored divisions"(State Archives, 1973, p 10). Ultimately, this was the mobilization figure approved by the Prime Minister.
6) There was no room for re-examination of the proposals raised and rejected by members of the decision group
The strongest example for polythink on October 6, 1973 was the issue of a preemptive strike, once this alternative was rejected by Dayan at the outset of the discussion, and later by Golda. The discussion afterwards focused almost exclusively on the issue of mobilizing reserves. That is, after Golda's decision not to authorize a preemptive strike, the possibility of launching a strike and improving conditions at the start of the war fell off the table completely and was not discussed again.
7) Limited review of alternatives
From early in the discussion on the morning of October 6, the focus was mainly on one issue -mobilization of reserves. Due to the political considerations of upcoming elections and secret negotiations with US mediation being held between Israel and Egypt in the period before the war, several alternatives were rejected. Specifically, a preemptive strike, and mobilization of the entire reserve force, both for defense and attack.
The latter alternative was rejected because it could imply that Israel was the one who plunged the situation into war.
The Polythink Syndrome on October 6, 1973: Explanations Mintz and Wayne (2016) provide five explanations for the Polythink Syndrome: institutional, political, ideological, leadership and management style, and expert/novice.
1) The Institutional explanation
According to the institutional explanation, members of the decision unit represent different and even competing bureaucratic entities. This has the potential to lead to lack or delay in sharing information, and keeping one's cards close to the chest. This often leads to confusion and miscommunication, the most prominent symptoms of polythink. The political leadership concealed information from the military and other members of the decision-making group about the secret negotiation channel with the Americans. Thus, important information was concealed that could have completed the picture (Kipnis, 2012) .
2) The political explanation
Each of those present on the morning of October 6, and in particular Dayan 
3) Experts and novices in the decision unit and their reputation
No doubt, the issue of seniority and reputation among members of the decision group significantly influenced the decisions made. For example Zeira's reputation, especially after the events of April and May, 1973, when many in the security apparatus warned of war, including the chief of staff, defense minister and head of the Mossad, while Zeira estimated that there would not be a war, and he was right. Dayan, perceived as a hero of the Six Day War, had acquired a great reputation in both the public and the political and security leadership. He also supported Zeira's assessment of the low probability of war (Bar-Joseph, 2001 ). These two key decisionmakers, highly reputed and experienced, heavily influenced the decisionmaking process and group dynamics vis-a-vis the current and former chiefs of staff.
4) Leader-followers relations
In direct continuation of the previous explanation, the background and role of each participant in the decision-making forum was of critical importance.
Prime Minister Golda Meir testified before the Agranat Commission, "I could not oppose the head of military intelligence or the chief of staff (Cohen, 12.09.13) . Brigadier General Lior also testified that Golda expressed her confusion to him when approached by military leaders and asked to make a military decision. The Prime Minister, the highest decision-making authority on security and strategic issues related to national security, and the" ultimate leader", found herself without the knowledge or ability to make an informed military decision. This enabled her subordinates, the defense minister and the chief of staff, to engage in an altercation that ultimately led to delayed decision-making-a clear evidence of Polythink.
5) Different points of view
There were also differences between the security prism and the politicaldiplomatic prism in the assessments of the situation. Defense Minister Dayan said, "…It was natural for the chief of staff to want these actions [to recruit all the reserves]. It is traditional for the military to demand maximal action. If limitations are necessary, they should be determined by the political leadership" (Dayan, 1976, p 576) . Contrary to Elazar, Dayan and Golda also considered the political ramifications of mobilizing the reserves just before the 1973 election.
Conclusions and Implications
The analysis of the positions held by members of the Israeli key decision unit on the morning of October 6, 1973 concerning the mobilization of reserves, a preemptive strike, and the likelihood of the outbreak of war on that day, revealed a number of interesting, even counter-intuitive insights.
First, the serious disagreements within the decision making group in the morning of October 6, clearly demonstrate that the group dynamic with regard to these decisions was very far from the groupthink syndrome that had characterized this decision unit up until October 6, 1973. conditions. Concerning the mobilization of the reserves, he said, "If things get worse, if the shooting starts at night, then we'll mobilize the rest" (Agranat Commission, 1975, p 40 Fourth, it is important to note that members of the decision group who supported only the partial recruitment of reserves were also against a preemptive strike, and those who saw the threat of war and supported a preemptive strike also supported wider mobilization of the reserves.
While the decision unit during the period preceding October 6, 1973 was marked by allegiance to the "concept" that there is a low probability for war, and a groupthink syndrome, no doubt that on the morning of October 6, disagreements and internal conflict within the decision group demonstrated the polythink syndrome on October 6th, as shown in this article.
